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It is suggested that this result could have been obtained by a decision
of less sweeping impact than the one rendered. The case could have been
limited to its facts by holding that a provision for setting off medical pay-
ments against uninsured motorist coverage contravenes public policy and
will not be given effect where the lessened coverage is not reflected in an
appropriately reduced premium. When there is a reduction in the premium,
the aggregate coverage would certainly be more than that prescribed by
the statute, and the cost of that portion of the coverage making up the
statutory minimum requirement would presumably not be different from
the cost of buying uninsured motorist coverage at a higher premium with-
out medical payment coverage. The fact that the required coverage would,
in that case, be supplied under two different endorsements is of no practical
significance; the insured is provided with the statutory protection as cer-
tainly as if he had bought only uninsured motorist coverage.
Under the Tuggle rule, the insured cannot avoid paying an uninsured
motorist premium that contemplates a double recovery, even if he does
not secure that windfall to himself by buying medical payments coverage.
The insurer, on the other hand, can only defend himself against the depre-
dations of an unscrupulous accident victim by shouldering the difficult
burden of showing that the expenses incurred were not reasonably neces-
sary. The Tuggle decision seems to motivate the insured to unconscionable
conduct by forcing him to contract for more than indemnification at a
higher premium.
PETER C. RAY
ACCOUNTANT'S LIABILITY TO THIRD PARTIES FOR
NEGLIGENCE
The plaintiff had a contract to purchase a large block of stock in the
Belcher-Young Corporation with an option to rescind if a certified finan-
cial statement revealed that the financial condition of the corporation had
changed adversely since the last statement shown to the plaintiff. The de-
fendants, certified public accountants, were engaged by Belcher to conduct
the audit and to prepare the financial statements knowing that the plain-
tiff intended to rely on their certification. The defendants were negligent
in the preparation of the financial statements, and the corporation subse-
would be afforded had the insured thereunder been involved in an accident with a
motorist who is insured under a policy of liability insurance with the minimum limits
provided under § 324.021(7). Such forms of coverage may include such reasonable
terms and conditions, including offsets which are designed to avoid duplication of
insurance and other benefits, as are commensurate with and reflected in the premium
charged therefor. The insurance commissioner shall give due consideration to the
coverage afforded in determining whether the premium therefor meets the require-
ments of Part I of Chapter 627 of the code.
Cf. Fuller, R.S., A Practical Approach to Florida's Uninsured Motorist Coverage. LL.M
THESIS, University of Miami, 1968.
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quently failed. The plaintiff, who had relied on the defendants' certification
in electing not to rescind the contract and who received nothing for its
stock, sued in three counts, alleging fraud on the part of defendants, a
third party beneficiary contract between defendants and Belcher, and
breach of the duty of care owed by defendants to known third parties.
The jury found for the defendants on the counts alleging fraud and a third
party beneficiary contract, and the count alleging negligence was dis-
missed. On appeal to the District Court of Appeal, Second District, held,
affirmed: Accountants are not liable to a known third party for negligence
in the preparation of certified financial statements, even though they know
that the third party intends to rely on them. Investment Corporation of
Florida v. Buchman, 208 So.2d 291 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1968).
The law governing the duty owed by accountants to parties with
whom they are not in privity grew out of the action of deceit. This is be-
cause words, rather than a physical force producing bodily injury or
property damage, are the force which produces an economic loss. Deceit
was long ago established to be an intentional tort, and the case of Derry
v. Peek1 has been understood to stand for the proposition that there is no
liability for negligent misrepresentations to those not in privity of con-
tract.2
The leading case in the United States involving the liability of ac-
countants for their certified statements is Ultramares Corporation v.
Touche' in which Mr. Justice Cardozo rejected negligence as a basis for
liability to persons not in privity of contract. Previously in Glanzer v.
Shepard' Cardozo had held a public weigher of beans liable to a purchaser
who relied on his negligent report, on the theory that the report was the
"end and aim of the transaction" between the seller and the defendant.
The refusal to allow recovery for negligence in Ultramares was due to a
fear of casting tremendous potential liability upon the accounting profes-
sion5 and a desire not to abolish the scienter requirement in actions in-
volving false representations. This fear of casting disproportionate li-
ability upon other professions has led the majority of courts to adopt the
Ultramares reasoning by denying recovery for negligence to those not in
privity.' Recovery was allowed in Ultramares for fraud in certifying a fact
1. [1889] 14 A.C. 337.
2. National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U.S. 195 (1879); Landell v. Lybrand, 264 Pa.
406, 107 A. 783 (1919) ; Le Lievre v. Gould, [1893] 1 Q.B. 491.
3. 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931).
4. 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275 (1922).
5. The court stated:
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure to detect a
theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may expose accountants to a
liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate
class. The hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme as to en-
kindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes
to these consequences ....
Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179-80, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (1931).
6. Texas Tunneling Co. v. City of Chattanooga, 329 F.2d 402 (6th Cir. 1964) (sur-
veyors); Sickler v. Indian River Abstract & Guar. Co., 142 Fla. 528, 195 So. 195 (1940)
1968]
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to be true without any knowledge as to its truth, and a subsequent decision
by the same court in a similar action' allowed the jury to infer fraud from
a grossly negligent failure to detect and reveal materially dishonest con-
ditions.8
Following Ultramares, the rule applied when investors or creditors
sought recovery from accountants was that in the absence of a contractual
relationship between the parties, liability could be founded only on fraud.9
On the other hand, when a physical force was negligently set in motion to
the injury of person or property, lack of privity of contract, as for war-
ranty liability, was no defense.1" This distinction between negligent acts
and negligent words in determining the scope of liability was widely up-
held until recently when the California Supreme Court, in Biakanja v.
Irving," permitted the beneficiary under a will to recover her loss from
the notary who prepared the instrument when it was denied probate due
to his negligence in failing to have it attested. The court gave the follow-
ing guidelines for determining whether or not to permit recovery in a non-
privity situation:
The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will
be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy
and involves the balancing of various factors, among which are
the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of cer-
tainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the con-
nection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered,
the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the
policy of preventing future harm. 2
The court in Biakanja followed the position of the Restatement" which
has been followed by only a minority of jurisdictions 4 and generally only
(abstractor); National Iron & Steel Co. v. Hunt, 312 Ill. 245, 143 N.E. 833 (1924) (in-
spector) ; Rosenberg v. Cyrowski, 227 Mich. 508, 198 N.W. 905 (1924) (attorney) ; Jaillet
v. Cashman, 235 N.Y. 511, 139 N.E. 714 (1923) (operator of ticker service) ; Peterson v.
Gales, 191 Wis. 137, 210 N.W. 407 (1926) (abstractor).
7. State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst, 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938).
8. This has been criticized as rendering "lip service to Derry v. Peek and yet allow[ing]
recovery in deceit for misrepresentation which falls short of actual intent to deceive." W.
PROsSER, TORTS 714 (3d ed. 1964). See also Comment, 41 ST. JOHNS L. REV. 588, 594 (1967).
Ultramares has likewise been criticized as an unnecessary shift from negligence to fraud in
determining the scope of duty. See Comment, 12 VAND. L. REv. 797 (1959).
9. See, e.g., O'Connor v. Ludlam, 92 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1937); Beardsley v. Ernst, 47
Ohio App. 241, 191 N.E. 808 (1934); American Indem. v. Ernst & Ernst, 106 S.W.2d 763
(Tex. Civ. App. 1937); Candler v. Crane Christmas & Co., [1951] 1 All E.R. 426.
10. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
11. 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958).
12. Id. at 650, 320 P.2d at 19.
13. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 552.
14. United States v. Neustadt, 281 F.2d 596 (4th Cir. 1960); Texas Tunneling Co. v.
City of Chattanooga, 204 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Tenn. 1962), rev'd, 329 F.2d 402 (6th Cir.
1964); United States v. Rogers & Rogers, 161 F. Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1958); Hardy v.
Carmichael, 207 Cal. App. 2d 218, 24 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1962) ; M. Miller Co. v. Central Contra
Costa Sanitary Dist., 198 Cal. App. 2d 305, 18 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1961); Lucas v. Hamm, 15
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when -the misrepresentation is made with knowledge and with the intent
that the particular plaintiff rely upon it.'5
There is also strong indication that the English courts will no longer
allow lack of privity to bar recovery in certain situations where a duty
ought to be owing. In Hedley Byrne Co. v. Heller & Partners,6 the House
of Lords, although denying recovery because of a valid disclaimer, went to
great lengths in evaluating English precedent 7 and concluded that, as a
general rule, a party will be liable for pecuniary harm resulting from a
negligent misrepresentation even in the absence of a contract or fiduciary
relationship.
The problem of determining the scope of liability for negligent breach
of contract producing economic loss is particularly vexing when accoun-
tants are involved. The accounting profession seeks to gain prestige by en-
couraging reliance upon their work and yet seeks to avoid liability when
an investor or creditor does so. Accountants argue that legal scholars urg-
ing extension of liability lack a practical understanding of the auditor's
work. 8 Legal writers on the other hand argue that,
The legal duties of the auditor ought to be co-extensive with his
professional pretensions. He aspires to more than being a rubber
Cal. Rptr. 821, 364 P.2d 685 (1961) (dicta) ; Duro Sportswear, Inc. v. Cogen, 131 N.Y.S.2d
20 (1954), aff'd, 285 App. Div. 864, 137 N.Y.S.2d 829; Howell v. Betts, 211 Tenn. 134, 362
S.W.2d 924 (1962) (dicta); Walker Bank & Trust Co. v. First Security Corp., 9 Utah 2d
215, 341 P.2d 944 (1959) ; Anderson v. Spriestersbach, 69 Wash. 393, 125 P. 166 (1912).
15. The draftsmen of the Restatement have recognized that their position was unsup-
ported by authority and have attempted to compromise their original position which per-
mitted recovery "by the person or one of the class of persons for whose guidance the
information was supplied .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 552.
The proposed position now reads:
(2) [Tlhe liability ... is limited to loss suffered
(a) by the person or one of the persons for whose benefit and guidance he
knows the information to be intended; and
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction in which it is intended to influence
his conduct.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 552 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1965) (emphasis added).
16. [1963] 2 All E.R. 575.
17. The court gave great weight to the analysis of Lord Denning who dissented in
Candler v. Crane Christmas & Co., [1951] 1 All E.R. 426, arguing that accountants owe a
duty of care not only to their own clients but also to all those whom they know will rely
on their accounts in the transactions for which those accounts are prepared. Lord Denning
also pointed out the error that had been committed in reducing Derry v. Peek to a flat rule
of law:
[A]t the time it was decided current legal thought was infected by two cardinal
errors. The first was . . . that no one who is not a party to a contract can sue on
it or on anything arising out of it. This error has had unfortunate consequences
both in the law of contract and in the law of tort .... [Ilt led the lawyers of that
day to suppose that, if one of the parties to a contract was negligent in carrying
it out, no third person who was injured by that negligence could sue for damages
on account of it . . . . The second error . . . was . . . that no action ever lies for
a negligent statement even though it is intended to be acted on by the plaintiff and
is, in fact, acted on by him to his loss.
Candler v. Crane Christmas & Co., [1951] 1 All E.R. 426 at 431-2.
18. Coakley, Accountants' Legal Liability, J. ACCOUNTANCY 58 (July 1968).
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stamp for management, so his legal duties ought to go beyond
that status. 9
The courts are mindful of Cardozo's arguments in Ultramares against im-
posing upon a profession an enormous potential liability which is far out
of proportion to the fault involved. Yet it is argued that the innocent cred-
itor or investor may also face financial ruin if recovery is denied." The
problem, then, is to find a rule of law which eliminates liability to the
large class of persons who could conceivably rely on the negligent state-
ment but which also extends liability beyond the contracting parties to a
small group whom the defendant expects and intends to influence.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, in the instant case
reasoned that recovery was precluded by the rule in Sickler v. Indian
River Abstract & Guaranty Co.,2 ' a case involving the liability of an ab-
stractor for negligence to a mortgagee who relied on the abstract. The
Restatement position2 2 was rejected as being in conflict with the precedent
of State Street Trust Co. v. Ernst.
23
Thus the court relied heavily on the language of a precedent involv-
ing another profession in formulating the rule to be applied, and the ques-
tion of whether there is a situation in which persons not in privity could
recover their economic losses was not left open. Therefore, it can fairly be
concluded that in Florida, when there is a lack of privity, there can never
be recovery for financial losses suffered as a result of negligent perfor-
mance of a contract. This would not preclude the Florida courts from per-
mitting recovery for fraudulent misrepresentations by allowing fraud to
be inferred from grossly negligent conduct,24 nor would a finding that a
third party beneficiary contract exists be precluded where the facts so
warrant. This being the case, it is conceivable that the scienter require-
ment could be relaxed whenever the court determines that justice requires
recovery by the third party.
This writer would favor an approach which attempts to solve the prob-
lem of the scope of the accountant's liability rather than the approach
taken by the court which would preclude recovery in all instances. Under
the present state of the law, however, when large sums are involved, seri-
ous investors should employ their own C.P.A. to conduct the audit. Alter-
natively, the prudent investor should become an express third party
beneficiary of the contract with the C.P.A. who performs the audit, thus
eliminating the roadblock of privity.
DENNIS P. SHEPPARD
19. Bradley, Liability to Third Persons for Negligent Audit, 1966 J. Bus. L. 190.
20. See Comment, 41 ST. JOHNs L. REV. 588, 600 (1967).
21. 142 Fla. 528, 195 So. 195 (1940).
22. See note 15 supra.
23. 278 N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938).
24. According to the precedent relied upon, liability for fraudulent misrepresentations
by accountants extends to the foreseeable class of persons who justifiably rely on them. Ultra-
mares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931) ; State St. Trust v. Ernst, 278
N.Y. 104, 15 N.E.2d 416 (1938).
